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Abstract—Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V)
and
Vehicle-toInfrastructure (V2I) networks are ephemeral, short-duration
wireless networks that have the potential to improve the
overall driving experience through the exchange of information
between vehicles. V2V and V2I networks operate primarily by
distributing real-time incident reports regarding potential traffic
problems such as traffic jams, accidents, bad roads and so on
to other vehicles in their vicinity over a multi-hop network.
However, given the presence of malicious entities, blindly
trusting such incident reports (even the one received through
a cryptographically secure channel) can lead to undesirable
consequences. In this paper, we propose an approach to
determine the likelihood of the accuracy of V2V incident
reports based on the trustworthiness of the report originator
and those vehicles that forward it. The proposed approach
takes advantage of existing road-side units (RSU) based V2I
communication infrastructure deployed and managed by central
traffic authorities, which can be used to collect vehicle behavior
information in a crowd-sourced fashion for constructing a more
comprehensive view of vehicle trustworthiness. For validating
our scheme, we implemented a V2V/V2I trust simulator by
extending an existing V2V simulator with trust management
capabilities. Preliminary analysis of the model shows promising
results. By combining our trust modeling technique with a
threshold-based decision strategy, we observed on average 85%
accuracy.
Index Terms—Connected Vehicles, Trust Management, Vehicular Networks

I. I NTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of wireless communication technologies, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-toinfrastructure (V2I) networks are increasingly becoming commonplace. Such networks possess an enormous potential in
improving driving safety and traffic conditions by sharing
road and traffic information, called incident reports, among
vehicles in real-time. The collaboration fostered by V2V communication enables individual vehicles to be more effective in
handling accidents and traffic congestions than they could by
themselves. However, the benefits of this V2V setup cannot
be fully realized unless one can effectively defend against
malicious or dysfunctional nodes (i.e., vehicles), which will
be inevitably present in its open environment. Such nodes,
collectively termed as attackers, may introduce fake or erroneous information within the network that selectively benefit
themselves, cause nuisance, and even harm others. Ensuring
information trustworthiness is therefore essential in V2V and
V2I networks.
The authors acknowledge the support of the US Department of Transportation under the University Transportation Center program.

In the paper, we explore an approach that facilitates more
reliable and effective trust decisions of the incident repots
received over V2V networks. This is done based on global
trust information aggregated by a central authority through the
road-side units based V2I infrastructure. Upon observing an
incident, a vehicle broadcasts a V2V message with an incident
report (e.g., accident, traffic congestion, broken bridge) to
other vehicles within its communication range. Each vehicle
receiving the incident report is then required to execute three
tasks: (1) whether to accept the received incident report, based
on its likelihood of being accurate; (2) if accepted, compute an
endorsement opinion, which signifies the level of endorsement,
on the incident report message; and (3) attach the computed
endorsement to the incident report and forward it down-stream.
With the proposed approach, these two decisions are made
based the trust score of the report originator and forwarders.
The trust score is computed by a central authority by aggregating vehicle behavior history w.r.t. incident report accuracy. To
facilitate the trust score computation, received incident reports
are voluntarily provided to the central authority over the V2I
channel in a crowd-sourced fashion by the vehicles in the
system. We rely on the crowd-sourced model as it has provided
highly effective traffic related information as demonstrated by
real-world services such as Google Maps.
We validated our proposed model using simulation. There
is a considerable dearth of available platforms to validate trust
management solutions for vehicular networks. Consequently,
we implement a V2V/V2I trust simulator by significantly
extending the GrooveNet simulation platform [1] with trust
management modules. The idea was not only to validate
our current approach, but also provide a flexible platform
for researchers to test and compare different trust modeling
techniques. Initial simulation results of our approach based
a Bayesian trust computation function have yielded encouraging results. We have observed clear separation in the trust
score obtained for different vehicle behavior pattern. And by
combining our trust modeling technique with a thresholdbased decision strategy, we obtain on average 85% accuracy
in determining its accuracy.
The contributions of this work are two-fold: (1) a new
trust model for vehicular networks leveraging the increasing
presence of V2I channels and crowd-sourcing capabilities, and
(2) an V2V/V2I trust simulator for validating the trust management proposals for vehicular networks. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows: Section II presents the related work.
Section III presents the problem statement followed by Section
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IV the trust model. Section V presents our new V2V/V2I trust
simulator. Section VI presents some preliminary results. In
Section VII, we conclude the paper.
II. R ELATED W ORK
Trust Management is a very broad field of research. An
overview of general trust management approaches can be
found in [2], [3]. It is important to note that for different
application domains, trust management approaches are often
highly customized to address application-specific requirements
or constraints. As observed in [4], only a few approaches
have been proposed in the literature to address trust issues
in vehicular networks. Some of the prominent approaches
for V2V trust are [5], [6], [7], which focus on using local
information available from the vehicles in the vicinity and
simple consensus schemes to decide whether to trust received
messages over the V2V network. We believe this provides
an inherently myopic world-view and therefore is ill-suited
for making good trust decisions. With the proliferation of
road-side unit (RSU) based V2I channels and the increasing crowd-sourcing capabilities, it is possible to collect and
manage a more comprehensive and global view of vehicle
behavior, which existing solutions fail to consider. Finally,
though much work has been done in trust modeling, little work
has been done in providing a platform for testing the strategies
developed in this regard. To the best of our knowledge we are
the first to provide a trust simulator platform for vehicular
networks that can be very useful for validating various trust
modeling techniques and trust decision making strategies.
III. S YSTEM M ODEL AND P ROBLEM S TATEMENT
In this paper, we focus on a typical application scenario of
a V2V network – propagation of real-time incident report. In
this scenario, an incident can randomly occur at any place and
time, which can have negative impacts on the traffic within a
designated area around the incident site. Examples of incident
include car accidents, bad road or weather conditions, etc..
In order to enhance road safety, incident information sharing
through V2V and/or V2I network in real-time can be very
useful to ensure timely management of traffic and to mitigate
other undesirable externalities.
An simple scenario of the incident report generation and
usage is illustrate in Figure 1. A vehicle driving on the road detects the occurrence of one or more incidents and automatically
generates and forwards an incident report to other vehicles
within its V2V communication range. The incident report
message contains the description of the incident (e.g., time,
location, severity level, etc.) to informs other vehicles. In this

paper, we call the vehicle, which serves as the original source
of incident report messages, the originator. Upon receiving
an incident report message, the receiving vehicle can make
driving decisions based on it. Further, it may choose to forward
this message to neighboring vehicles within its communication
range to further propagate the information. We call all the
vehicles on the message propagation path except the originator,
the receivers. And we call all intermediate vehicles on the
message propagation path, the forwarders. Many communication protocols have been proposed in the literature to facilitate
the routing of such incident reports and other messages over
V2V networks [8], [9], [10]. Besides V2V communications,
RSUs and other infrastructure facilities may also participate
in this process to either relay the message further when the
vehicle density is low [11], or play an important role in cryptokey distribution process for secure the V2V communication
[12]. However, none of these schemes focus on providing
mechanism to ensure the accuracy of the incident report itself.
The accuracy of the incident report is crucial to ensure the
effectiveness of such real-time information sharing capability.
It is easy to imagine an attack scenario, where malicious entities introduce false or misleading incident information causing
adverse traffic conditions. The problem being studied in this
paper is “how can one evaluate the accuracy of the traffic
incident information shared by individual vehicles within a
V2V network?”
IV. T RUST M ODEL
The key idea proposed in this paper is to construct a
trust model for each vehicle participating (i.e., originating and
forwarding) the V2V-based incident report propagation. This
trust model is designed to compute a trust score that represents
the likelihood that a vehicle originates or forwards accurate
incident reports to other vehicles. In this section, we provide
an overview of the main elements of this trust model including
our assumptions about the overall system, behavior exhibited
by the vehicles and the trust modeling process. Please note
that, in this work, we assume that all messages exchanged over
the V2V and V2I network are cryptographically protected. The
focus of this work is therefore solely on computing effective
trust score for the vehicles.
A. Vehicle Behavior Collection & System Assumptions
Due to the ephemeral nature of V2V networks, no individual
vehicle can have a sufficient view of other vehicle’s incident
report behavior to effectively reason about trustworthiness.
However, if one can design an effective mechanism to collect observation and experiences about individual vehicles,
it would greatly facilitate the process of aggregating partial
and incomplete information into meaningful global picture.
Based on the observation above, we assume a vehicle behavior
information collection infrastructure (VBII) by taking advantage of existing V2I communication channels. With such an
infrastructure, local RSUs can be used by vehicles to provide
a central authority (e.g., regional traffic management centers)
with the incident reports its received from other vehicles. The
central authority can correlate such vehicle behavior with its
own database of traffic incidents with the benefit of hindsight
to reason about a vehicle’s trustworthiness.
Upon receiving an incident report, a vehicle can use the
trust score of the originator and the forwarders obtained from

the central authority for making its decisions regarding: (1)
whether to accept the received incident report, based on its
likelihood of being accurate; and (2) if accepted, to compute
an endorsement opinion on the incident report message before
forwarding it down-stream. To ensure the viability of the
proposed scheme, we make three assumptions.
First, although the central authority cannot know about
the occurrence of traffic incidents in real-time, it will know
the ground truth information of an incident after a certain
period of delay Tdelay . This assumption is very reasonable and
realistic since in the event of traffic incidents, the local traffic
management center is informed of such an occurrence, and an
official record on the incident is maintained. In the future, we
would like to incorporate other reliable ground truth sources.
For instance, by combining the usage of loop detectors and
traffic cameras, regional traffic management authority can
achieve near real-time detection of incidents.
Second, vehicles will report back the behavior of other
vehicles they observe (i.e., the incident reports they receive
and the endorsement opinions expressed by the originator
and various forwarders) to the central authority. This crowdsourcing of traffic information is relatively common, and it
has already been used by services such as Google Maps. We
therefore assume that the percentage of vehicles providing
such feedback will be relatively high. Please note that in our
scenario the incident detection is an automatic and mandatory
process. The reporting of the incident reports (also called
feedback) to the central authority is voluntary.
Last but not the least, we assume the existence of an unique
identifier system for vehicles. Concretely, it can be in form
of an e-license, which also embeds other vehicle information
(e.g., vehicle purpose, owner, etc.). Several proposals on
implementing such ID systems has been available, and some
states in US have already made some initial progress.
To facilitate this vehicle behavior collection process, we
requires that all incident reports carry the IDs of the originator
and the forwarders. Additionally, the incident report has an
opinion field that stores one’s endorsement of the report
accuracy. The value range of the opinion is (0, 1), where 1
(or 0) indicates the max (or min) belief of the incident report
message. When a vehicle is within the communication range
of a RSU, it can voluntarily report back to the central authority
about the incident messages it has originated or received,
using the V2I communication channel. To ensure authenticity,
integrity, and accountability of the vehicle behavior tracking
process, one can use the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) as
part of the vehicle ID system that covers all the participant
vehicles managed by the central authority.
B. Trust Modeling & Trust-based Decision Making
The central authority computes the trustworthiness of the
vehicles based on the vehicle behavior information it receives
and the ground truth of incident is revealed as time evolves.
The trust score T has two representations in our system: a
vector representation and a scalar representation, similar to
the proposal in [13]. The vector representation of T is a
triple (t, c, f ). The value t is the measured trust computed
based on the vehicle behavior history of providing accurate
incident reports. The value f is the default trust obtained using
static information about the vehicle such as vehicle type (e.g.,
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ambulance, police car), vehicle ownership history (e.g., Carfax
report). It is easy for the central authority to obtain these static
information about individual vehicles, and the default trust can
be used in lieu of measured trust, when little vehicle behavior
information is available. The default trust f can also be used
as an effective mechanism to encode existing trust schemes,
such as role-based trust management [14]. For instance, known
types of trustworthy vehicles like police vehicles, can be
given full trust by default, which is very useful for trust
bootstrapping. We can convert the vector presentation of T
into its scalar representation using the following equation:
Tscalar = t ∗ c + (1 − c) ∗ f
Where the value c is a weight factor to determine how
much measured trust and default trust contributes in the scalar
representation. It is our plan to evaluate various approaches
to compute the measured trust as a part of this work. As an
initial step, we have designed a trust model based on Bayesian
statistics. Essentially, the Bayesian trust model computes an
probability estimation t by assuming the vehicle behavior
can be modeled as an independent and identically distributed
random variable. At any given time, for all the incidents
with known ground truth, the trust value t of a vehicle v is
computed by the following equation:
P v
Oc
P
P
t=
Ocv + Oiv
P v
Here,
Oc is the sum of endorsement opinions expressed
by vehicle v on incident reports that correctly match with the
ground truth of incident (i.e., the occurrencePof the reported
incidents is known to be truthful). Similarly,
Oiv is the sum
of endorsement opinions expressed by vehicle v on incident
reports that mismatch with the ground truth of incident.
Despite the simplicity, our preliminary evaluation shows very
promising results of its effectiveness, as shown in Section VI.
The vehicle trust score is periodically updated by the central
authority and distributed to vehicles in the scalar form using
V2I channels through RSUs. When a vehicle is within the
communication range of certain RSU, it can actively query
the central authority to obtain the most updated trust score of
all the vehicles observed by the authority. The obtained trust
score can be used by vehicles for making more informed trust
decisions. In this regard, a simple strategy is to compare the
trust score of the originator of a received incident report to a
predefined trust threshold tthreshold . We have evaluated this
trust decision strategy in Section VI. It is our plan to design
and exercise more sophisticated strategies in future research.
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V. V2V/V2I T RUST S IMULATOR
Seeing the dearth of platforms available for simulating
trust in V2V networks, we decided to build a V2V/V2I trust
simulator. In this regard, we considerably extended an opensource hybrid-network simulator called GrooveNet [1] with
trust modeling capabilities. The screen-shot of our simulation
system is shown in 2. In the simulator Vehicle is the principal
entity in the simulator (shown as color circles in Figure
2). All properties of the vehicle including its start-point,
movement and communication capabilities are managed by
the underlying GrooveNet simulator. This section provides a
overview of the principal extensions that we have made to
GrooveNet as part of implementing the trust simulator.
Simulation Manager: The entire simulation process is controlled by a simulation manager, which is in charge of the creating, loading, saving and running simulations. All the entities
used in the simulation (e.g., vehicles, infrastructures, incidents,
trust models) can be configured through an XML simulation
configuration file. The design of a simulation manager and an
XML configuration file allows the repeatability of experiments
– one of the primary requirements of a simulator. One can
easily replay the same scenario setup for many different trust
modeling techniques in order to perform comparison studies.
Vehicle Roles: In GrooveNet each vehicle in the system is
identified with an unique IP address. However, as part of the
trust simulator we add the notion of roles to the vehicles to
encode different behavior patterns of incident detection, incident reporting and message forwarding. By default, vehicles
in our simulator can have one of three built-in roles:
1) Authority: An authority vehicle detects and honestly
reports incidents as it patrols the map randomly. It
only forwards the incident report message from other
authority vehicles.
2) Normal: A normal vehicle acts properly by following the
traffic rules. It selectively forwards messages believed to
be accurate, and drops the ones it deems inaccurate. It
also actively reports all incident messages it has received
back to RSUs.
3) Attacker: An attacker maliciously affects the vehicular
networks by means of intentionally reporting fake incidents and suppressing the propagation of the accurate
messages it receives. And it never reports back to RSUs.
Please note that, this is not an exhaustive set of roles that
the vehicles can exist in our system. Other roles can be added
or existing ones modified easily to enable the simulation of
more diverse vehicle behaviors.
Incident Model & Incident Detection: In our system, incidents reports are generated as a result of incident detection.
We added the notion of incident to GrooveNet (shown as
yellow warning signs in Figure 2), which is described with
attributes such as start time, duration, geographic location,
severity, etc. in the XML simulation configuration file. In
real-world scenario, incident detection is primarily done using
driver input and/or various types of sensors such as RADARs,
LIDARs, and cameras embedded in vehicles [15], [16]. For
simplicity, our simulator abstracted this out and defined a
configurable parameter called detection diameter for each
vehicle. The detection diameter is the geographical distance
between the location of the incident and current position of
the vehicle along its moving direction. An incident will be
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Fig. 3. Average Trust Score trend for vehicles with attackers and normal
role at various percentages of incident report feedback

detected if it is in the range of the vehicle’s detection diameter
along its direction. This allows to cater for vehicle having
different sensing systems and therefore different detection
capabilities.
Infrastructure Model & Trust Modeling Module The RSU
model (shown as black squares in Figure 2) is part of the
VBII and has similar communication capacity as the vehicle
model. However, it does not have the mobility model since
all RSUs are stationary at fixed locations. Although RSUs
will not join the process of incident report propagation, it is
capable of collecting vehicle behavior information and sending
trust scores back to vehicles. In our simulator we also have
the notion of a configurable time delay Tdelay , infrastructures
will know the ground truth of the reported incidents, which
can be used for computing the measured trust t of vehicles.
The default trust computation module used by the simulator
is the one described in Section IV. This module can be easily
replaced with other trust modeling techniques as needed.
VI. P RELIMINARY E VALUATION
In order to validate our approach setup, we set up a
simulation scenario with 70 vehicles in total using the map
of New York city. We have 50 vehicles with normal role
type, 10 vehicles with attacker role, and 10 with authority
role. For attacker vehicles, the frequency of sending incorrect
incident reports was set to 30 seconds/message. Normal vehicles only accepted and forward a received incident report
if the trust-score of the originator is greater at least 0.7 (i.e.,
tthreshold = 0.7). Further, any incident report forwarded by a
user has an endorsement opinion associated with it, which is
computed as AV Gtmax ∗ tmax . Here, AV Gtmax is the average
endorsement opinion expressed by vehicles with the highest
trust score (tmax ) among the originator and forwarders of the
incident report. Authority vehicles are always assigned with
the highest trust score set to 1 by the central authority. Further,
they only accept and forward messages from other authority
vehicles with an endorsement opinion of 1.
Our simulation introduced 20 incidents with average duration 20 minutes over the map with random starting time. We
assume the ground truth of the incidents are known after a
five-minute delay (i.e., Tdelay = 5 mins). The start location
of vehicles, the location of RSUs and incident occurrence are
evenly distributed over the map area. Figure 3 shows the trend

of average trust score of vehicles with normal and attacker
role types under different levels of crowd-sourced indent
feedback ratio. Both the attackers and the normal vehicles
begin with a trust score of 0.5. As we can see, after an initial
“bootstrapping” time (approximate equal to Tdelay ), the trust
score of the two role types evolve in two different directions.
After around 15 minutes, the trust value begin to settle, and we
can see the clear separation between the two curves, respective
of different feedback ratio. When the feedback ratio is low, it
takes longer for the system to separate the attacker form the
normal. Also, the separation margin is narrower.
Additionally, we have also measured the accuracy of trust
decisions. For normal vehicles, a simple threshold-based decision strategy is able to achieve around 85% of decision accuracy with 4% average false positive rate (i.e., trust incorrect
incident reports) and 21% average false negative rate (distrust
correct incident reports). The root cause for the false positive
is due to the mixed behavior patterns of attackers – before the
trust score converges within a stable range, some attackers can
have relatively high trust values temporarily. The root cause
for the false negative is due to two main reasons : (1) the low
trust scores of attackers lead to other vehicles to distrust even
the correct incident reports originated by them; and (2) during
the trust bootstrapping stage, normal vehicles are assigned with
the default trust value (i.e., 0.5), which is lower than the trust
decision threshold. However, we can see that both the trust
bootstrapping and temporary trust value fluctuation is shortlived in our experiment (i.e., around 15 minutes), and we can
achieve 1% false positive rate and 9.6% false negative rate,
when the trust value converges.
These results demonstrate our approach which relies on a
more centralized, crowd-sourced vehicle behavior monitoring
is clearly promising. These are only preliminary results, a more
thorough analysis of the approach by varying the number of
vehicles, attackers and attacker behaviors is being performed.
An interesting analysis in this regard would be the communication and storage overhead for setups with large amount
of vehicles and frequent interactions. We also plan to explore
different trust modeling techniques and trust decision strategies
using our setup and also perform a more detailed comparison
with the existing trust modeling approaches.
VII. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an trust-based approach to
determine the likelihood of information accuracy under V2Vbased incident report setting. By taking advantage of V2I
channels between vehicles and central traffic authorities, we
can construct a global view of individual vehicles trustworthiness in a crowd-sourced fashion, which overcomes the lack
of vehicle behavior information due to the inherent ephemeral
nature of vehicular networks. We also significantly extended an
existing simulation platform with trust modeling capabilities
to validate our approach. Our preliminary evaluation shows
promising result on the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
In the future, there are three directions that we would like to
explore: (1) we plan on using our new simulator for a more
thorough analysis of the proposed approach and compare the
proposed approach with existing trust management proposals
for vehicular networks; (2) we would like to improve of the
communication overhead, the impact of unreliable communi-

cation channel, and the cost of infrastructure deployment; (3)
we would like to further study the trade-off of security and
privacy issues introduced by using unique identifiers and PKIs.
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